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Article 2: Sales
By DAVID R. MASON*
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing with sales, is stated
to be a complete revision and modern'ization of the Uniform Sales Act.'
Montana never has adopted this act, although it has been adopted in thirty-
six states and the District of Columbia. This resistance over a period of
half a century to the trend in other jurisdictions should not be used as a
precedent to justify failure to carefully consider for enactment the sales
article of the Code, since in rebuilding upon the decisions and mercantile
customs of the past fifty years the Code makes many changes not only in
terminology but also in substance from the existing law.
Transactions Covered
The sales article applies only to transactions in "goods,"' the defini-
tion of which is based upon the concept of movability, and the term "chat-
tels personal" is not used.' Investment securities and things in action are
not covered." This article does not apply to "any transaction which al-
though in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is
intended to operate only as a security transaction,"' thus leaving sub-
stantially unaffected the law relating to purchase money security such as
conditional sale or chattel mortgage.'
The word "fixture" has been avoided,' and the concept of "industrial"
growing crops has been abandoned.' The article does, however, cover
"things attached" which can be served "without material harm" to the
realty.' Timber, minerals or structures are covered only if they are to
be "severed by the seller." If the buyer is to sever such things, the trans-
action is considered a contract affecting land and all problems of the
Statute of Frauds and of the recording of land rights apply to them.'
Distinctions Between Merchants and Others
The Code goes beyond present law in treating "merchants" as a
special class, in their dealings with each other and with the public. Of
*Professor of Law, Montana State University. Member of the Montana Bar. LL.B.
1924, B.A. 1926, University of South Dakota; S.J.D. 1927, Harvard University.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101, comment. (Hereinafter UNIFoIL COMMEaCIAL
CODu is cited UCC.)
2The Uniform Sale8 Act was recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform
Laws in 1906 for enactment in the several states. The first states to enact it
were Arizona, Connecticut, and New Jersey in 1907; the last states to adopt it
were Arkansas and Colorado in 1941.
'UCC § 2-102. It is provided that statutes regulating sales to consumers, farmers
other specified classes of buyers are not impaired or repealed. Probably this is of
no significance In this state, since there seems to be no special treatment accorded
such classes of buyers.
'UCC § 2-105, commenti 1. Unborn young animals are included, since they are fre-
quently intended for sale and may be contracted for before birth. The reason of
the definition also leads to the inclusion of a wool crop or the like. Ibid.
'UCC § 2-105(1).
'UCC § 2-102.
'UCC § 2-102, comment.
aUCC § 2-107, comment 2.
'UCC § 2-105, comment 1.
"UCC § 2-107(2).
1"UCC § 2-107(1) and comment 1.
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course, the law of merchants, later incorporated into the common law, de-
veloped as a result of the application of special rules to merchants, and
occasionally statutes are found prescribing different duties for merchants
than for non-merchants. For instance, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947,
section 74-321, provides that "one who makes a business of selling pro-
visions for domestic use warrants, by sale thereof, to one who buys for
actual consumption, that they are sound and wholesome."' Nevertheless,
the Code is unusual in its provisions for special rules which apply to the
professional trader, and difficult and novel questions of fact will arise
in determining who is to be so regarded.
"Merchant" is defined as "a person who deals in goods of the kind
or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to
whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself
out has having such knowledge or skill."' Thus, the position of a person
as a merchant may be based upon specialized knowledge as to the goods,
specialized knowledge as to business practices, or specialized knowledge as
to both. Which kind of specialized knowledge is sufficient to establish
the merchant status is indicated by the nature of the provision."
One class of special provisions appears in sections dealing with the
Statute of Frauds,' "firm offers,"' confirmatory memoranda,1' and modi-
fication.' These provisions are considered to "rest on normal business
practices . . . typical of and familiar to any person in business,"' and,
therefore, are applicable to anyone "who . .. by his occupation holds him-
self out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices . . .involved
in the transaction." A comment states: "In this type of provision, banks
or even universities . . . may be 'merchants.' But even these sections
only apply to a merchant in his mercantile capacity; a lawyer or bank
president buying fishing tackle for his own use is not a merchant. '
The class of special provisions applicable only to those who have a
professional status as to the particular kind of goods, is restricted to a
much smaller group than that to which the first class of provisions applies.
The section dealing with implied warranty of merchantability provides
that the warranty is implied only "if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind.'"m In the same class are provisions with respect to
retention of possession by sellers,' and entrusting possession of goods to
another."
"Under RzVIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947,§ 27-101, this implied warranty of the
article sold extends to the public generally. Bolith v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109
Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 433 (1939). (Hereinafter REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA are
cited R.C.M.)
'3UCC § 2-104 (1).
"UCC § 2-104, comment 2.
51CC § 2-201 (2).
'UCC § 2-205.
IUCC § 2-207 (2).
'UCC § 2-209 (2).
'9UCC § 2-104, comment 2.
2'Ibid.
'UCC § 2-314.
-UCC § 2-402 (2).
UCC § 2-403 (2).
1959]
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The third class of provisions, which applies to persons who are mer-
chants under either the "practices" or the " goods" aspect of the defi-
nition of merchant,' includes sections with respect to "good faith," the
responsibility of merchant buyers to follow seller's instructions, ' risk of
loss,' and adequate assurance of performance. '
Rejection of Title as Basis for Legal Consequences
Perhaps the most striking departure by the Code from present law
is its abandonment of the concept of title as a basis for determining the
rights of parties. American courts generally have held that the location
of title governs the rights of parties in the law of sales, in the absence of
special circumstances justifying a different rule. The Supreme Court
of Montana has recognized the significance of title in determining who has
the risk of loss of the goods and whether the seller may maintain an
action for their price. ' A statute provides that the right to rescind for
breach of warranty not intended by the parties to operate as a condition
depends upon whether the sale is executed. '
The purpose of the Code to make the location of title immaterial, so
far as possible, is stated in the comment to the first section of the sales
article, as follows:
The legal consequences are stated as following directly from the
contract and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of
when property or title passed or was to pass as being the determin-
ing factor. The purpose is to avoid making practical issues between
practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something,
the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substi-
tute for such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tan-
gible character.
The Code proceeds to state the legal consequences of specific fact
situations, and provides that "each provision of this Article with regard
to the rights, obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers
or other third parties applies irrespective of title to the goods except
where the provision refers to such title.'
The rules relative to risk of loss in the absence of breach are specified
in section 2-509. Subsection (1) reads as follows:
(1) Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular
destination, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are
TMUCC § 2-104, comment 2.
21UCC § 2-103 (1) (b).
' UCC §§ 2-327(1) (c), -603, -605.
2 UCC § 2-509 (3).
-UCC § 2-609.
"DeMers v. O'Leary, 126 Mont. 528, 535, 254 P.2d 1080, 1084 (1953); Old Ken-
tucky Distillery v. Stromberg-Mullins Co., 54 Mont. 285, 169 Pac. 737 (1917)
Mette & Kanne Distilling Co. v. Lowrey, 39 Mont. 124, 101 Pac. 966 (1909).
8'R.C.M 1947, § 74-403; Rickards v. Aultman and Taylor Machinery Co., 64 Mont.
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duly delivered to the carrier even though the shipment is under
reservation (Section 2-505) ;' but
(b) if it does require him to deliver them at a particular destina-
tion and the goods are there duly tendered while in the possession
of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods
are there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer to take delivery.
A Montana case serves to demonstrate the change effected in the
existing commercial law. In William Merchantile Co. v. Fussy,' the ques-
tion was with respect to the right of a seller to recover the price of a
carload of apples shipped by a seller at St. Joseph, Missouri, to a buyer
at Missoula, Montana. In accordance with the order, the seller shipped
f. o. b. St. Joseph, taking a bill of lading in his own name, which, with
a sight draft attached, was sent through a bank and presented to the
buyer. The buyer refused to honor the draft or to receive the apples be-
cause they had frozen en route. In sustaining a judgment for the defendant,
the court said: "When the bill of lading was taken in the shipper's name
the presumption arose that he intended to retain the title in himself. This
presumption must stand as conclusive until it is rebutted by affirmative
proof on the plaintiff's part.'"
As against this position, the Code analysis would run somewhat as
follows: Since the goods were to be shipped f. o. b. St. Joseph, the con-
tract was not one, which required delivery at destination, and under section
2-509 the risk of loss would pass to the buyer when the goods were de-
livered to the carrier. Such being the case, under section 2-709 (1) (a)
the seller could recover the price if the goods were "lost or damaged with-
in a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the
buyer."' Even if the loss in transit were not regarded as within such
time, the seller could nevertheless under section 2-709 (3) recover damages
for non-acceptance.
Subsection (2) of section 2-509 contains provisions for risk of loss
where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved.
Due delivery of a negotiable document of title covering the goods or
acknowledgment by the bailee that he holds for the buyer passes the risk.
If the case is not one where the contract authorizes the seller to ship
the goods by carrier nor one where the goods are held by a bailee to be
delivered without being moved, the Code contains provisions differentiat-
' This section is concerned with the reservation. of a security interest in the
goods.
"15 Mont. 511, 39 Pac. 738, 48 Am. St. Rep. 698 (1895).
"Cf. Old Kentucky Distillery v. Stromberg-Mullins Co., supra, note 29, at 292,
Pac. at 736. "[T]he delivery of goods by a seller to a carrier for shipment to the
purchaser, in the absence of circumstances indicating a contrary intention, is
sufficient. . . to vest title in the purchaser. . -. The rule is elementary." But
,it was held that this rule did not apply where the buyer directed that the goods
be assigned to himself and the seller consigned them to another person with the
request that they be reassigned to the buyer. Cf. UCC § 2-510 (1).
The better view is that taking a bill of lading to the seller or his order merely
to enable the seller to exercise control as security for the price does not prevent
the passing of beneficial ownership with the usual benefits and burdens thereof.
VOLD, SAT s § 105 (1931) ; Annot. 60 A.L.R. 677, 691 (1929) ; UNIFORM SAsa AcT
J 22.
'The phrase "commercially reasonable time" is new with the 1957 revision and
does not appear to be defined or explained.
1959]
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ing between a merchant seller and a non-merchant seller.' If a seller is
to make physical delivery at the situs of the goods the risk of loss passes to
the buyer on tender of delivery. But if the seller is a merchant and de-
livery is to be made at his place of business or the situs of the goods, the
risk of loss remains on the seller until actual receipt of the goods by the
buyer, even though full payment has been made and the goods are at
the disposal of the buyer. The comment explains that the merchant seller
is in control of the goods and can be expected to insure them.
The rules with respect to risk of loss where there has been a breach
of the sales contract are separately stated in section 2-510. Subsection (1)
provides: "Where a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the
contract as to give a right of rejection the risk of their loss remains on
the seller until cure or acceptance." This seems to state the present rule
in Montana that the risk of loss remains on the seller when he has "de-
viated from the contract in a substantial particular. '' But the Code again
correlates the reality of insurance coverage with the legal rules and con-
tains provisions to put the real or out of pocket loss on the wrongdoer.
Thus if, after accepting nonconforming goods, the buyer asserts the right
to revoke, the seller is responsible for any loss in excess of the buyer's
insurance coverage."
Conversely, if the buyer breaches before the risk of loss passes to him,
he will be held responsible for the deficiency between the actual loss and
the insurance coverage.
Form of Contract: Statute of Frauds
Montana has adopted a statute patterned after the original Statute
of Frauds passed in England in 1677.' R.C.M. 1947, section 74-201,
provides :"
No sale of personal property, or agreement to buy or sell it for a
price of $200 or more, is valid unless:
1. The agreement or some note or memorandum thereof be in
writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his agent;
or
2. The buyer accepts and receives a part of the thing sold, or when
it consists of a thing in action, part of the evidences thereof, or
some of them; or
3. The buyer at the time of sale, pays a part of the price.
NUCC § 2-509 (3) provides: "In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the
risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a
merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery."
'lOd Kentucky Distillery v. Stromberg-Mullin4 Co., supra note 29.. In Mette &
Kanne .Distilling Co. v. Lowrey, supra note 29, the court held that one who
seeks to recover the contract price of goods shipped on order is bound to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that they are of the kind and quality ordered.
'UCC § 2-510 (2) reads: "Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may
to the extent of any deficiency in his insurance coverage treat the risk of loss
as having rested on the seller .... "
'"UCC § 2-510 (3) reads: "Where the buyer as to conforming goods already identified
to the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in breach before risk of their
loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent of any deficiency in his
effective insurance coverage treat the risk or loss as resting on the buyer for a
commercially reasonable time."
'Gravelin v. Porier, 77 Mont. 260, 250 Pac. 823 (1926).
'uSimilar provisions are contained in R.C.M. 1947, § §. 13-606 (4), 93-1401-7.
[Vol. 21,
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The Uniform Commercial Code completely rephrases the statute. It
provides :"
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient
to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not
insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph be-
yond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of sub-
section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable.
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for
sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this pro-
vision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted.
The most obvious differences between the Montana statute and the
Code are in the coverages. The Code establishes a $500 minimum; the
Montana statute sets $200 as the minimum." This provision of the Code
is restricted to the sale of "goods" and does not include things in action,
as does the Montana statute," although a separate article of the Code
contains provisions applicable to investment securities which conform to
the policy of the provisions with respect to the sale of goods.'
Both the Code and the Montana statute contain exceptions with re-
spect to goods to be manufactured. The Montana statute excludes from
the Statute of Frauds "an agreement to manufacture a thing, from ma-
terials furnished by the manufacturer, or by another person. '" The Code
provides that an oral contract will be enforceable, "if the goods are to
be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before
notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substan-
tial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procure-
ment.' "
The extent to which this provision of the Code qualifies the Montana
rule is somewhat doubtful. On its face, the Montana statute appears to
adopt former holdings of the New York courts which distinguished be-
tween a contract for goods to be manufactured and a contract for goods
already in existence even though something remains to be done before the
-UCC § 2-201.
'"The $500 minimum conforms to that in the UNIFORM SALES AcT § 4.
"The Montana statute follows the pattern of the UNIFORm SATES AcT § 4 in cover-
ing choses in action.
'aUCC § 8-319, and comments.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 74-202.
"UCC § 2-201 (3) (a).
1959]
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goods are in deliverable condition. However, the Uniform Sales Act adopted
a rule derived from Massachusetts, and distinguishes between goods manu-
factured for the general market and those manufactured especially for the
buyer. 8 It is this rule which the Code adopts, and the Montana statute
may be construed to conform to it."
Very clearly the Code requirement that the seller, before notice of
repudiation, shall have made a "substantial" beginning of manufacture,
or shall have "made commitments" for procuring the goods, extends the
Statute of Frauds to cases not thertofore within it and introduces difficult
questions as to what is "substantial" and what is a "commitment."
The Code materially relaxes the requirements as regards the essential
elements of the memorandum. In Dineen v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court
of Montana stated the rule that "the note or memorandum must contain
the essentials of the contract so that they may be ascertained from the
writing without a resort to oral evidence." A memorandum omitting terms
of the agreement, such as the amount, number and date of installment
payments, the rate of interest on unpaid balances, when possession was to
be delivered, that the buyer would execute a mortgage as security for the
purchase price balance, and that the buyer would keep the property insured,
was held to be insufficient."
Under the Code it is not required that the writing contain all the
material terms of the contract. As is stated in a comment, only three
definite requirements are made: "First, it must evidence a contract for
the sale of goods; second, it must be 'signed', a word which includes any
authentication which identifies the party to be charged; and third, it
must specify a quantity. )'2
The comment also states that it is not necessary that the memorandum
indicate which party is the buyer and which is the seller, the price, time
and place of payment or delivery, the general quality of the goods, or any
particular warranty. Even the quantity term need not be accurately stated,
but recovery is limited to the amount stated.
Another major change brought about by the Code is in respect to
partial performance as a substitute for the required memorandum. Under
the Montana statute acceptance and receipt by the buyer of any part of
the thing sold or payment by the buyer of any part of the price is suf-
ficient to take the entire transaction out of the statute.' But under the
4See 2 CoasI., CoNTRAcTs § 477 (1950) ; 1 WILL sroN, SALS § 55 (rev. ed. 1948).' See Golden Eagle Milling Co. v. Old Homestead Bakery, 56 CaL App. 541, 211
Pac. 56 (1922).
'123 Mont. 195, 213 P.2d 241 (1949).
5Under this rule, as the court pointed out, little need be stated in a simple pay
and take agreement; much more in an involved transaction or agreement. Also,
it is sufficient if all the material elements of the agreement are stated in
general terms in the memorandum; all the details or particulars need not be
stated. Further, it was held in Lewis v. Aronow, 77 Mont. 348, 251 Pau. 146
(1926), that no greater strictness is required in respect to the competency of
the parol evidence to be applied to contracts within the statute of frauds than
is applied to written contracts in general. "Parol evidence may be admitted to
show the situation and relation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances
at the time the instrument was made."
"UCC § 2-201, comment 1.
"See Spurgeon v. Imperial Elevator Co., 99 Mont. 432, 43 P.2d 891 (1935); 2
CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 428 (1950) ; 1 Wl.usTON, S.,ms § § 94, 98 (rev. ed. 1948).
[Vol. 21,
7
Mason: Article 2: Sales
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1959
ARTICLE 2: SALES
Code such partial performance "can validate the contract only for the
goods which have been accepted or for which payment has been made
and accepted.' '' A comments explains that, "if the court can make a just
apportionment ... the agreed price of any goods actually delivered can be
recovered without a writing or, if the price has been paid, the seller can
be forced to deliver an apportionable part of the goods.' '
The provision of the Code relating to merchants has no counterpart
in the law of Montana. It is provided, in effect, that if a writing is sent
confirming the contract of sale, which writing is adequate to charge the
sender, it will also bind the person receiving it as though he had signed
it, unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten
days after it is received.' In other words, between merchants, failure to
answer a written confirmation of contract within ten days dispenses with
the requirement of a memorandum. The effect "is to take away from the
party who fails to answer the defense of the Statute of Frauds; the burden
of persuading the trier of fact that a contract was in fact made orally
prior to the written confirmation is unaffected."'
Contract Rules
At serveral points the Code modifies general contract law as applied
in the sales area. Sales and agreements to sell are contracts,' and the
Supreme Court of Montana in a sales case has stated the established con-
cept of a contract in this language: "The rule is well settled that, in order
to form a contract, there must be an offer by one party and an unconditional
acceptance of it by the other in accordance with its terms. . . , and that,
if the acceptance falls within or goes beyond the terms of the offer or makes
a condition at variance with the proposal, there is no contract and the
transaction amounts to one of proposals and counter proposals .... "'
Contrary to this rule, under the Code between merchants additional
terms in an acceptance become a part of the contract, unless (1) the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, (2) they materially
alter it, or (3) notification of objection is given within a reasonable time.'
Again as to merchants, the Code is contrary to the established rule
that offers unsupported by consideration may be withdrawn at any time
prior to their acceptance.' A signed written offer by a merchant to buy
or sell is not revocable for lack of consideration during the time for which
it is stated that it will be held open, or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, provided that the period of irrevocability may not exceed three
months.'
The Code expands the present rule that shipment of goods in re-
sponse to an order is an acceptance.' An order for prompt shipment may
UCC § 2-201, comment 2.
r'Ibid.
"UCC § 2-201 (2).
:C § 2-201, comment 3.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-101 to -106.
'J. Neils Lumber Co. v. Farmers' Lumber (o., 88 Mont. 392, 397, 293 Pac. 288, 290.
(1930).'OUCO § 2-207(2) (a), (b), (c).
"See I WImIsBToN, CONTRACTS § 61B (3rd ed. 1957).
UUCO § 2-205.
"I CowN, Co T AcTs § 70 (1950).
19591
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be accepted by a prompt promise to ship," apparently regardless of the
actual intent of the offeror to require the act of shipment. ' Also, ship-
ment of non-conforming goods constitutes an acceptance, unless the seller
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as accommodation to
the buyer." Thus an act which constitutes a breach may at the same time
be an acceptance,' and there is nothing in the Code provision which under-
takes to limit the extent of the non-conformance in the shipment which
may have this effect.'
However, in situations where the beginning of a requested performance
may be considered as an acceptance, an offeror who is not notified of ac-
ceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed. '
Provisions for open price terms in the contract depart from existing
law. Of course, if the property in the goods is transferred reasonable price
may be substituted for agreed price as a quasi contractual obligation. But
the law applicable to executory contracts has been stated by the Supreme
Court of Montana as follows: "Where a contract of sale is executory,
the price to be paid must be definitely stated or made capable of definite
determination. "
Under the Code, executory contracts which fail to fix a price or the
means of ascertaining the price are valid, if the parties intend a binding
agreement. The price is the reasonable price at the time of delivery.'
Again, the established rule that the modification of a contract must
be supported by consideration is departed from. The Code permits modi-
fication, provided it is made in good faith, without the necessity of con-
sideration."
There are special provisions making it possible for courts to police
contracts or clauses of contracts which are "unconscionable," without resort
to adverse construction of language, manipulation of rules of offer and
acceptance, or determination that contracts or clauses are contrary to
public policy. The Code permits courts in their discretion to refuse to
enforce any such contract or clause, or limit it so as to avoid unconscion-
able results. Parties must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present
evidence as to the commercial setting, purpose and effect of the contract
or clause claimed to be unconscionable. This evidence is for the court's
consideration, not for the jury's.TM
Warranties
The Code changes the law of warranties at several points. It was an
early requirement of the law that the buyer should have relied upon the
-UCC § 2206 (1) (b).
"UCC § 2-206, comment 2, states that the Code provision is In accord with
ordinary commercial understanding of the meaning of such an order. Cf. CoRmN,
CONTRACTS § 70 (1950).
NUCC § 2-206 (1) (b).
OUCC § 2-206, comment 4.
'See criticism by Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Code, 63 HARV. L. REv. 561, 577-78 (1950).
"UCC § 2-206 (2).
"Lewis v. Aronow, 77 Mont. 348, 359, 251 Pac. 146 (1926).
-UCC § 2-305.
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seller's representation in order that there be an express warranty," and
the Supreme Court of Montana has stated this to be the rule in this state."
Under the Code, however, according to a comment, no particular reliance
on the seller's statements need be shown in order to make them a part of
the agreement. The theory is that affirmations of fact by a seller about
goods during a bargain should be regarded as part of the description of
goods.'
The Code continues recognition of implied warranties of fitness for a
particular purpose and of merchantability, but at some points it broadens
such warranties while at others it narrows them. In Montana a seller
makes no implied warranty of fitness for intended use unless he manu-
factures the goods under order for the particular purpose." The only
qualification to this appears to be in the case of one who makes a business
of selling provisions for domestic use, who warrants by the sale thereof
that they are sound and wholesome."' But under the Code, regardless of
the character of the goods, it is not necessary that the seller be a manu-
facturer or even a dealer. The Code provides for such a warranty if the
seller has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on his skill and judgment." On the
other hand, there is an implied warranty of merchantability under the
Code only if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind
sold,' and a person making an isolated sale is not a merchant.' Under
the Montana statute anyone who sells merchandise inaccessible to the
examination of the buyer thereby warrants that it is sound and merchant-
able.' Apparently the Supreme Court of Montana has construed this
statute to exclude an implied warranty of merchantability if the mer-
chandise is subject to the examination of the buyer and if he has an equal
opportunity with the seller to discover its defects.' Under the Code im-
plied warranties are not excluded unless the buyer has in fact examined
"1 WImSTON, SALES § 206 (rev. ed. 1948).
'"Jones v. Armstrong, 50 Mont. 168, 175, 145 Pac. 949, 951 (1915); Lundquist v.
Jennison, 66 Mont. 516, 522, 214 Pac. 67, 69 (1923).
7'UCC § 2-313, comment 3.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-310, -316.
78R.C.M. 1947, § 74-321. This statute has reference to something to be consumed
as food. Harrington v. Montgomery Drug Co., 111 Mont. 564, 567, 111 P.2d 808,
810 (1941). Is is not confined to food consumed by human beings but includes
provisions consumed by animals. Seaton Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil
Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P.2d 549 (1950).
"UCC § 2-315, comment 4. The Code modifies the law under the Uniform Sales
Act by extending the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose to pur-
chase by particular patent or trade name, provided the purchase is made in
reliance on the seller's skill and judgment. UCC § 2-315, comment 5. Cf. UNmFosm
SALEs AcT § 15 (4). In Montana there is no exclusion from any implied warranty
of articles sold under patent or trade name. On the contrary, one who sells an
article to which there is attached a trade mark thereby warrants that trade mark
to be genuine and lawfully used. R.C.M. 1947, § 74-318. Under the Code, it is
only when goods are a part of the seller's normal stock and are sold in his normal
course of business that it is the duty of the seller to see that no claim of
infringement of trademark (or patent) by a third party will mar the buyer's
title. UCC § 3-312 (3).
"UCC § 2-314. The definition of merchantable goods under the Code is detailed
and exact. The Montana statutes contain no definition.
mUCC § 2-314, comment (3).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 74-317.
"Harrington v. Montgomery Drug Co., 111 Mont. 564, 567, 111 Pac. 808, 809 (1941).
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the goods or has refused on demand by the seller to examine them, and
in such situations implied warranties, both of fitness for a particular pur-
pose and of merchantability, are excluded with regard to defects which
an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to the buyer. '
Under existing law warranties may be excluded by express stipulation
in the contract of sale, the Supreme Court of Montana having said that
it "must assume that the parties entered into the contract with their eyes
open, having known and understood all its provisions and stipulations."'
The Code also recognizes the validity of disclaimer clauses, but seeks to
protect the buyer from unexpected language. Implied warranties may be
excluded by expressions like "as is," "with all faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclu-
sion and makes it plain that there is no implied warranty." But subject
to this provision, disclaimers of warrauties of merchantability must men-
tion "merchantability" and in case of a writing must be conspicuous;
and disclaimers of warranties of fitness must be by writing and conspicu-
ous.e'
The Supreme Court of Montana has held that the statutory provision
for warranty of food offered for sale extends only to the immediate pur-
chaser, on the theory that the warranty arises out of the contractural
relations of the parties. However, reliance has been placed on the pro-
visions of the Pure Food and Drug Act for the extension of the warranty
to the public generally, it being reasoned that the act of selling impure
food is unlawful and the seller is responsible for the natural consequences
of his wrongful act.' Under the Code the buyer's family, household and
guests, are given the benefit of the same warranty, whether express or
implied, which the buyer receives in the contract of sale. It is only as
to the buyer's family or household, however, that the Code abolishes the
rule of privity. The -developing case law is neither enlarged nor restricted
as to liability to others in the distributive chain.'
Assurance of Performance and Anticipatory Repudiation
The Code contains novel provisions imposing on buyers and sellers an
obligation that the other party's expectation of receiving due performance
will not be impaired. If "reasonable grounds for insecurity" arise, the
party affected may in writing demand adequate assurance of due per-
formance and until he receives such assurance may "if commercially rea-
sonable" suspend any performance for which he has not received the agreed
return. Failure to provide such assurance within a reasonable time not
exceeding thirty days is repudiation of the contract.' According to a
comment, the provisions permitting suspension of performance embody the
same principles which govern the ancient law of stoppage in transitu and
8'UCC § 2-316 (3) (b).
'Friesen v. Hart-Parr Co., 64 Mont. 373, 374, 209 Pac. 986 (1922).UUCC § 2-316 (3) (a).
7UCC § 2-316 (2). Warranties may also be excluded or modified by course of
dealing, performance or usages of trade. UCC § 2-316 (3) (b).
MKelley v. John R. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63, 181 Pac. 326 (1919) ; Bolltho v. Safe-
way Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95 P.2d 443 (1939).
OUCC § 2-318, comment 3.
TTCC § 2-609 (1).
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seller's lien, and also of excuse of a buyer from prepayment if the seller's
actions manifest that he cannot or will not perform. The provision re-
quiring adequate assurance is a reflection of clauses in contracts permitting
the seller to curtail delivery if the buyer's credit becomes impaired. The
provision permitting the aggrieved party to treat the contract as at an end
embodies the principle underlying the law of anticipatory breach. '
There are provisions for immediate right of action for anticipatory
breach. The aggrieved party after the repudiation may await performance
by the repudiating party for a reasonable time, or resort to any remedy
for breach even though he has notified the repudiating party that he would
await the latter's performance."
Remedies of the Seller
The remedies given a seller in the event of the buyer's insolvency have
been expanded under the Code. Although the goods have been delivered
to the buyer and regardless of the transfer of title, the seller may reclaim
the goods within ten days, subject to the rights of a good faith purchaser
or lien creditor, when he discovers that the buyer received the goods while
insolvent. Further, if there is a misrepresentation of solvency in writing
within three months of delivery, the ten day limitation does not apply."
The basic proposition appears to be that any receipt of goods on credit by
an insolvent buyer amounts to a tacit misrepresentation of solvency and
therefore is deemed to be fraudulent as against the seller."
The remedies of the seller have been further enlarged by giving him,
when he learns of the buyer's breach, the right to identify conforming goods
to the contract, if they are in his possession or control.'
As has been indicated, the Code materially changes the law with re-
spect to a suit for the purchase price, and under the Code the passing of
title is not material to an action for the price." Generally under the Code,
such action is "limited to those cases where resale of the goods is imprac-
ticable except where the buyer has accepted the goods or where they have
been destroyed after risk of loss has passed to the buyer."'
The seller's rights of resale are expanded. Under the Montana statutes,
a seller who remains in possession "after payment is due" or "when the
price becomes payable" may rescind the sale, or he may enforce his lien
for the price in the manner provided for the foreclosure of a pledge.' Al-
though these statutory provisions apply to executory as well as executed
sales," yet they do not seem to contemplate resale in the case of an antici-
patory breach. The Code, on the other hand, enlarges the rights of resale to
the point where the seller may resell the goods after any breach, even an
anticipatory breach, and this is supplemented by express authorization of
9UCC § 2-609, comment 2.
'UCC § 2-610.
-UCC § 2-702.
"UCC § 2-702, comment 2.
"UCC § 2-704. Williston has criticised this and some other provisions on the
ground that they permit increased damages. Williston, supra note 68, at 586.
"Text at notes 29-39.
'UCC § 2-709, comment 2.
"R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-302, 45-1104.
"Welch v. Nichols, 41 Mont. 435, 441 110 Pac. 89, 91 (1910) ; Evankovich v.
Howard Pierce, Inc., 91 Mont. 344, 8 P.2d 653 (.1932).
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resale of goods which are not in existence or identified to the contract be-
fore breach.'
The meticulous restrictions in Montana on the manner of resale in en-
forcing a seller's lien have been described by the Supreme Court of Mon-
tana as follows :'
Under the law of pledges, the pledgee may collect what is due him
on the pledge by the sale of the property . . . , but before the sale
is made the pledgee must demand performance by the pledgor, if
he can be found .. . , and must give actual notice to the pledgor of
the time and place of sale far enough in advance of the sale to
permit the attendance of the pledgor at the sale ... ; the sale must
be at public auction, after notice to the public, and the property
must be sold for the highest obtainable bid.
The Code does not so limit the seller, but merely requires him to act
"in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner" in making the
resale, and requires notice of intention to resell if the sale is a private sale
and reasonable notice of the time and place of sale if public except if the
goods are perishable and threaten to decline swiftly in value.' No dis-
tinction is drawn, as it has been in Montana, " between cases where the title
has not passed to the buyer and the seller resells as owner and cases where
title has passed and the seller resells by virtue of his lien.''
Resale as provided by the Code permits the seller to retain any profit
from the resale." Failure to conform with the provisions of the Code does
not prevent a bona fide purchaser from taking good title, although, of
course, it does affect the damages recoverable by the seller.'
Remedies of the Buyer
There are several significant changes in the existing law in regard to
the remedies of a buyer where a seller breaches his contract to sell. In
Montana the buyer may recover damages measured by the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market value at the time and place of de-
livery.' Under the Code the measure of damages for non-delivery or re-
pudiation by the seller is the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time the buyer learns of the breach."
With respect to damages for breach of warranty, the rule in Montana
is that the measure is the difference between the actual or market value of
'0 'UCC § 2-706.
...Evankovich v. Howard Pierce, Inc., 91 Mont. 344, 352, 8 P.2d 653, 656 (1932).
""UCC § 2-706.
'"3Welch v. Nichols, supra note 99.
'"UCC § 2-706, comment 3.
'05UCC § 2-706 (6), and comment 11.
'UCC § 2-706 (1), (5), and comments 2, 10.
"Montana Livestock and Loan Co. v. Stewart, 58 Mont 221, 190 Pac. 985 (19W).
R.C.M. 1947, § 17-308 provides: "The detriment caused by the breach of a
seller's agreement to deliver personal property, the price of which has not been
fully paid in advance, is deemed to be the excess, If any, of the value of the
property to the buyer, over the amount which would have been due to the seller
under the contract, if it had been fulfilled." "Value of the property to the
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the property at the time to which the warranty referred, and the actual or
market value which the property would have had at the time to which the
warranty referred if the warranty had been complied with.' The Code
is explicit in providing that the time and place of acceptance shall control
the measure of damages.'
In determining market value, if the goods are regularly bought and
sold in any established commodity market, reports in official publications
or trade journals or in newspapers of general circulation published as re-
ports of such market are admissible in evidence. The circumstances of
preparation of such a report may be shown to effect its weight but not its
admissibility.'
The Code introduces a concept of "cover" as additional protection for
a buyer in cases where the seller does not deliver or repudiates or the buyer
rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes. The buyer may obtain goods in
substitution for those due from the seller, and recover from the seller as
damages the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price to-
gether with incidental or consequential damages, but less expenses saved
as a result of the seller's breach."'
The Code ends the harsh rule requiring the buyer to elect between
rescission and damages for breach.' In stating the buyer's rights where
the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully re-
jects or justifiably revokes acceptance, the Code provides that the buyer
may "cancel" and recover so much of the price as has been paid in addi-
tion to damages."' Further, in extending the remedies for fraud to coin-
cide in scope with those for non-fraudulent breach, the Code provides that
rescission does not bar a claim for damages.'
The above directs attention to some of the more significant provisions
of article 2 of the Code. While in a considerable measure this article con-
tinues the law as now embraced in the Uniform Sales Act, yet it is new
in its approach and it makes significant changes and additions to the law
of sales. The conceptualistic approach found in the Uniform Sales Act
is abandoned as inadequate to meet present needs, and the law is adjusted
and expanded to cover realistically commercial relationships and practices
as they now exist. Some difficulty of adjustment to the provisions of
article 2 may be encountered by those schooled in the present sales law, but
it is believed that the Code provisions are an improvement over other
statutes in a field where need for certainty and uniformity peculiarly calls
for legislation.
1R.C.M. 1947, § 17-313; Rickards v. Aultman and Taylor Machinery Co., 64 Mont.
394, 210 Pac. 82 (1922); Fryburg v. Brinck, 92 Mont. 294, 12 P.2d 757 (1932).
See also, Butte Floral Co. v. Reed, 65 Mont. 138, 211 Pac. 325 (1922).
flOUCC § 2-714 (2).
1'UCC § 2-724. Of. Evankovich v. Howard Pierce, Inc., supra note 101.
12UCC § 2-712.
'Several Montana cases have laid down the rule that if there is a breach of
warranty by the seller, the buyer may either rescind and recover the purchase price
or retain the goods and recover damages for breach, but that he cannot do both.
Fryburg v. Brinck, supra note 109; Rickards v. Aultman and Taylor Machinery
Co., 64 Mont. 394, 210 Pac. 82 (1922) ; Advance-Rumley Thresher Co. v. Terpening,
58 Mont. 507, 193 Pac. 752 (1920).
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